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Long-run technological progress is cyclical because drastic in-
novations that introduce new technological opportunity are only
proﬁtable at times when repeated incremental innovation has
nearly exhausted existing technological opportunity and driven
entrepreneurial proﬁt and income growth towards zero. The ar-
ticle presents a ’technological opportunity model’ where endoge-
nous drastic and incremental innovations interact with exogenous
discoveries in an idealized metric technology space. New ideas
are created by convex combinations of existing ideas. Diminish-
ing technological opportunity results in lower proﬁts and growth,
which then makes costly and risky drastic innovations proﬁtable
again. This relationship between intense drastic innovation inten-
sity and poor levels of economic growth receives some empirical
support.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Long-run technological progress has hardly ever been a smooth process.
Periods of revolutionary advance have been succeeded by periods of stag-
nation. During just a short span of years around 1880, innovations such
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1as electric light, the automobile, the telephone, the phonograph, the
fountain pen, and the bicycle appeared in a burst of technological ac-
tivity (Gordon, 2000). Another revolutionary wave of innovations took
place in the 1930s when television, radar, synthetic rubber, colour pho-
tography, and FM radio were introduced (van Duijn, 1983). In contrast,
not more than a handful major innovations were made during the two
and a half centuries between 1500-1750 (Mokyr, 1990) and surprisingly
few major innovations can be associated with the 1960s and 1970s. In the
1990s, it was once again felt that innovations within IT- and biotech-
nology were about to revolutionize production and possibly even lead
to a ’new economy’. Why does technological progress proceed in this
cyclical fashion? Considering the signiﬁcant impact that technological
knowledge is believed to have on standards of living and on economic
development in general, it appears that a better understanding of the
reasons behind the cyclical evolution of technology would be very useful.
The main idea behind this article is to put technological opportunity
at the center of analysis. I develop a simple model where rational en-
trepreneurs exploit existing technological opportunity by making incre-
mental, non-revolutionary innovations within the limits set by the pre-
vailing technological paradigm. As technological opportunity becomes
exhausted, proﬁts and income growth rates diminish. Eventually, proﬁts
from incremental innovation fall below expected proﬁts from highly risky
and costly drastic innovations. Entrepreneurs then switch to drastic in-
novation, which introduces new areas of technological opportunity and
a new technological paradigm. When technological opportunity once
again is abundant, incremental innovation resumes and growth rates
increase. In this way, development proceeds in long waves of varying
duration and intensity. The fundamental determinants of the economy’s
behaviour are the capacity of a society to exploit existing technological
opportunity and its system of rewards for drastic innovation.
Similar notions of long run development have been advanced by re-
searchers in the ’long wave-tradition’, notably Schumpeter (1934, 1942),
Mensch (1979), Freeman (1983), van Duijn (1983), and Kleinknecht
(1983). Schumpeter (1934, 1942) famously argued that discontinuous
’swarms of ”new combinations”’ (innovations), carried out by entrepre-
neurs, disrupted the ’circular ﬂow’ of the economy and induced a cyclical
pattern of development that was characterized by ’creative destruction’
of existing ﬁrms and monopoly proﬁts. Schumpeter’s theory was de-
veloped theoretically as well as empirically by Mensch (1979). In his
’depression-trigger’ theory of development, Mensch argues that waves
of drastic innovations tend to appear in depressions when investment
inertia and lack of technological opportunity drive proﬁts to zero. On
2the basis of a compilation of 111 ’basic innovations’ made between 1796
and 1955, Mensch shows that clusters of innovations indeed did appear
around 1880 and 1930 in the wake of major downturns in the economy.
Later works have reﬁned Mensch’s list of innovations (Clark et al, 1983;
van Duijn, 1983; Kleinknecht, 1983), but this has not altered the basic
pattern of two long waves that Mensch demonstrated.
Both Schumpeter and Mensch associate slowdowns in economic ac-
tivity with the failure of ﬁrms to come up with new, drastic innovations.
However, the somewhat vague and unformalized notions of the reasons
behind slowdowns in innovation and economic activity, are probably the
weakest links in the Schumpeter/Mensch-hypothesis.1 The model in this
article proposes that it is waning technological opportunity rather than
a change in ﬁrms’ or consumers’ behaviour that cause declining prof-
its and growth.2 Following Olsson (2000), technological opportunity is
explicitly modelled at the micro level as the nonconvex segments of a
technological knowledge set, embedded in a multidimensional technology
space of all possible ideas. Incremental innovations take the shape of
linear, binary combinations of closely related ideas already in the tech-
nology set. When repeated combinations have made the technology set
convex, technological opportunity is exhausted. Only a technological
paradigm shift - i.e. the occurrence of a cluster of drastic innovations
that combine ideas in the technology set with distant and isolated discov-
eries - has the potential to reintroduce nonconvexities and technological
opportunity.
The model presented in this article is related to several previous
theoretical contributions. In a model on long-run ’Schumpeterian cy-
cles’, Jovanovic and Rob (1990) distinguish between ’extensive search’
for new inventions or major discoveries on the one hand, and ’intensive
search’ for reﬁnements of a given invention on the other. It is shown
that extensive search will only be carried out when the expected payoﬀs
from this activity exceed expected payoﬀs from intensive search. Given
speciﬁc parameter values for the level of technological opportunity and
the costs of extensive search, a cyclical behaviour emerges where inno-
vators switch repeatedly between search activities. Boldrin and Levine
(2001) construct a similar model where agents switch from working on
new ’generations’ of capital (incremental innovations) to working on new
’types’ of capital (drastic innovations) when all possible generations of
1In a famous review of one of Schumpeter’s works, Kuznets (1940) criticizes the
Schumpeterian model along the same lines.
2Caballero and Jaﬀe (1993) and Kortum (1997) provide empirical evidence sug-
gesting that technological opportunity has fallen steadily since the 1950s. As will be
shown below, this observation is well in line with the results of this model.
3a certain type of capital have been found. A primary diﬀerence between
these models and the one worked out below is that unlike in Jovanovic
and Rob (1990) and Boldrin and Levine (2001), technological progress
is seen as the result of convex combinations of existing ideas in a tech-
nology space. Furthermore, technological opportunity is endogenously
determined and varies over time.
The article is also associated with the literature on General Purpose
Technologies (GPTs) (David, 1990; Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995;
Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Helpman, 1998; Caselli, 1999). A GPT is
essentially what this article deﬁn e sa sad r a s t i ci n n o v a t i o n .T h ed a t eo f
arrival of a new GPT is often assumed to be exogenously given (Helpman
and Trajtenberg, 1998) or to follow a random Poisson process (Aghion
and Howitt, 1998). In addition, Aghion and Howitt (1998), Helpman and
Trajtenberg (1998), and Boldrin and Levine (2001) all share the predic-
tion that the onset of the new major technology causes a slowdown in
the economy because of the necessary reallocation of resources from the
old to the new sectors. Only after a certain critical level of adjustment
activities, the new technology is fully implemented and a period of boom
starts. This hypothesis that drastic technological change causes the eco-
nomic downturn, stands in contrast to the ’depression-trigger’ model of
Mensch where it is the downturn that causes the wave of technological
change.
The full model in this article, based on the insights from the set
theoretic framework, makes the assumption that it is in times of eco-
nomic depression when technological opportunity nears exhaustion that
the wave of drastic innovations will occur. Unlike in the GPT models,
the technological revolution is endogenously determined and happens
when expected proﬁts from incremental innovation fall below expected
proﬁts from drastic innovation. The actual proﬁts that entrepreneurs
make from drastic innovations in the short term are random and might
deepen or ease the depressionary tendencies. However, the paradigm
shift reintroduces technological opportunity so that entrepreneurs in the
next period once again can make large proﬁts from incremental innova-
tion.
Simulations of the model suggest several diﬀerent scenarios in terms
of growth rates, cycle duration, and ﬁnal output levels, depending on
how the model is calibrated. In one scenario, long waves of about ﬁfty
years in duration is produced which seems to ﬁt the general picture of
economic development in the Western world during the last two hundred
years. Comparing three indice on drastic innovative activity with aver-
age growth rates per capita for the United States, the UK and Germany
for the period 1870-1968, it is demonstrated that the model roughly
4makes the correct predictions about the sequencing of events and the
timing of the two clusters of drastic innovations around 1880 and 1930.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the two ba-
sic premises of the article; that there are three kinds of technological
progress and that innovation activity is asymmetrically distributed in
time. Section 3 then outlines the set theoretic analysis of the interac-
tions between drastic innovations, incremental innovations, and discov-
eries in a multidimensional technology space. Section 4 describes the
details of the full model when technological opportunity is integrated
into an economic growth framework. Section 5 presents simulations of
the model and discusses the results in the light of long run estimates
of GDP growth rates per capita for three leading economies. Section
6 analyzes the diﬀerences in long run growth predictions between the
neoclassical model, the AK-model, and the technological opportunity
model. The last section gives the concluding remarks.
2 Two Basic Premises
The technological opportunity model below rests on two basic premises:
(i) That there are three kinds of technological progress. (ii) That inno-
vative activity follows a cyclical pattern.
2.1 Three Kinds of Technological Progress
A fundamental premise for the argumentation below is that there are
essentially three kinds of technological advance: (i) Incremental innova-
tions, (ii) drastic innovations, and (iii) discoveries.
Incremental innovations are small, non-revolutionary changes in tech-
nology that are carried out by proﬁt-oriented entrepreneurs.3 This kind
of innovations reﬁne existing knowledge in a predictable fashion and are
generated when entrepreneurs combine older insights that are in techno-
logical proximity. The costs and risks associated with this activity are
relatively low. Incremental innovations are also highly path dependent,
following speciﬁc technological trajectories (Dosi, 1988). The bound-
aries to incremental innovation are set by the prevailing technological
paradigm which deﬁnes the opportunities of technological research at
some point in time. Incremental innovation is the normal activity for a
progressive entrepreneur.
As the label suggests, drastic innovations are radically new ideas that
are reached after deliberate eﬀorts at combining previously unrelated
3The deﬁnition of incremental innovations used here follow Helpman (1998), but
there are several related concepts in the literature such as ’microinventions’ (Mokyr,
1990) ’reﬁnements’ (Jovanovic and Rob, 1990) and ’secondary innovations’ (Aghion
and Howitt, 1998).
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are by nature associated with high risks and costs, but usually also with
the possibility of signiﬁcant ﬁnancial rewards. As with incremental in-
novation, the entrepreneur is the main agent in this process and his sole
motive is commercial success. The most important characteristic of a
drastic innovation is that it opens up new ﬁelds of technological oppor-
tunity. The concept is therefore closely related to what Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg (1995) and Helpman (1998) refer to as a ’General Purpose
Technology’ (GPT).4 A drastic innovation is an ’enabling technology’ in
the sense that it makes possible the evolution of a whole new class of
new technologies. Using the language of Kuhn (1962) and Dosi (1988), a
cluster of drastic innovations gives rise to a new technological paradigm,
a new outlook on the relevant problems and on the ways to solve them.
When the new paradigm is generally accepted, a period of normal in-
cremental innovations resumes along the trajectories deﬁned by the new
paradigm.
The third kind of technological advance, discovery, has some simi-
larities to a drastic innovation. Like a drastic innovation, a discovery
is a completely new piece of knowledge that is markedly diﬀerent from
the predictable results of incremental innovation. It does not ﬁti n t ot h e
prevailing pattern of established facts and is therefore, initially, looked
upon as something of an anomaly to the ruling technological paradigm.
However, the new idea is not the result of purposeful entrepreneurial
combination processes. My deﬁnition of a discovery is meant to describe
the accidental empirical ﬁnding of some phenomenon, often while con-
ducting normal science with the aim of ﬁnding something completely
diﬀerent. Thus, it is not necessarily entrepreneurs that make the dis-
covery. It might just as well be a scientist or a layman who happen to
stumble upon something previously unknown.
The most important diﬀerence between a discovery and a drastic in-
novation is that the former is not an enabling technology or a GPT since
it does not immediately introduce new ﬁelds of technological opportu-
nity. Nor does it have any immediate commercial potential. For longer
or shorter periods of time, discoveries might remain as separate islands
outside the prevailing paradigm. Not until some entrepreneur deliber-
ately makes a successful drastic combination between the ideas inherent
in the older paradigm and the new discovery - i.e. a drastic innovation
- technological opportunity increases and a new technological paradigm
is eventually introduced.
4The phenomenon has also been described as a ’new combination’ (Schumpeter,
1934), ’basic innovation’ (Mensch, 1979), ’macroinvention’ (Mokyr, 1990) and as
’fundamental innovation’ (Aghion and Howitt, 1998).
6In order to make the argumentation clearer, I will oﬀer some his-
torical examples. Beginning with incremental innovations, it should be
noted that these make up the vast majority of innovations in all ﬁelds.
Since the drastic innovation of automobiles driven by internal combus-
tion engines was carried out in the 1880s by Karl Benz and Gottlieb
Daimler, repeated incremental innovations have led to vast improve-
ments. The ﬁrst car that Benz built in 1885 was a three-wheeler, pow-
ered by a two-cycle engine, and probably much slower than a horse.
The contrast to a modern car in terms of speed, energy use, reliabil-
ity, and comfort is of course striking. Yet all these improvements had
the character of incremental innovations, made possible by the drastic
innovation of internal combustion engines. Speciﬁci n c r e m e n t a li n n o v a -
tions are not often referred to in books on the history of technology but
are nonetheless of paramount importance for technological and economic
development.
The history of drastic innovations, on the other hand, is well-known
and documented in numerous academic works. In this category are for
instance such enormously important innovations as the wheel, writing,
sedentary agriculture, the spinning wheel, the clock, the electric light
bulb, the internal combustion engine, nuclear power, and the computer.
The most famous innovation of all times is probably the steam engine.
The development of the steam engine is a typical example of how major
technological change proceeds and it also illustrates the close interde-
pendence between discoveries and drastic innovations.5
In the seventeenth century, Galileo’s student Evangelista Torricelli
became the ﬁrst man to create a sustained vacuum, which led to the
realization that there existed an atmosphere. This remarkable insight
was gained as a biproduct of trying to construct a more eﬃcient vac-
uum pump. At ﬁrst, no immediate use of this new empirical ﬁnding
was found. Nor was it easily reconciled with the prevailing technological
paradigm. However, the discovery of atmospheric pressure was picked
up decades later by Thomas Newcomen who in 1712 constructed an at-
mospheric engine that was successfully used for pumping water out of
coal mines. Finally, in 1769, James Watt claimed a patent for a steam
engine based on the same principles as Newcomen’s engine but with a
separate condenser which greatly improved eﬃciency. The steam engine
opened up technological opportunities in several ﬁelds and soon revolu-
tionized transportation, mining, and the textiles industry. Yet it must
be remembered that a prerequisite for Newcomen’s and Watts’ drastic
innovations was the unintentional discovery of atmospheric pressure.
Examples of discoveries, serving as the main stimulus to subsequent
5The exposition on steam engines relies on Mokyr (1990).
7technological progress, are indeed manifold. For instance, we can conﬁ-
dently assume that the human use of ﬁre was initiated after innumerable
horror-stricken but gradually more curious observations of the devasta-
ting eﬀects of ﬁres ignited by lightning. Once tamed, ﬁre revolution-
ized prehistorical technology for cooking, housing, hunting, and warfare.
Most metals and other natural materials that humans have learnt to use
through history are also discoveries in the right sense of the word. Only
long after the discovery of iron did humans learn how to process iron into
more useable forms. Some of the most important drastic innovations of
all times - like the telegraph, the electric motor, and the electric light
bulb - could be made in the wake of the scientiﬁcd i s c o v e r yo felectric-
ity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the beginning of the
nineteenth century, however, it was not at all obvious to entrepreneurs or
scientists what electricity could be used for (Lipsey et al, 1998). Lastly,
Alexander Fleming’s accidental discovery in 1928 of the dramatic eﬀect
of moulds on bacteria - paving the way for the drastic innovation peni-
cillin - is probably one of the most clearcut cases of an unintentional
discovery with pervasive eﬀects on technology and human welfare.
2.2 Cyclical Innovative Activity
A second fundamental premise in this article is that the growth of tech-
nological knowledge is asymmetric in time. This notion is certainly not
new. In older research on long waves, the unevenness of technologi-
cal advance was seen as an important reason for the cyclic long-run
behaviour of output and productivity.6 Schumpeter (1934, p 223) ar-
gues that ’new combinations’, i.e. drastic innovations carried out by
entrepreneurs, ’...are not, as one would expect according to general prin-
ciples of probability, evenly distributed through time...but appear, if at
all, discontinuously in groups or swarms.’ This swarm-like appearance
of drastic innovations and entrepreneurial activity occurs, ’Exclusively
because the appearance of one or a few entrepreneurs facilitates the ap-
pearance of others, and these the appearance of more, in ever increasing
number.’ (Schumpeter, 1934, 228).
Based on empirical evidence on the timing of drastic innovations
(see below), Mensch developed his ’depression-trigger’ or ’metamorpho-
sis’ model where the long-run evolution of the economy is described in
terms of logistic industrial development curves. Each industrial cycle is
initiated by a cluster of drastic innovations. When the cycle has reached
its maturity level where the curve ﬂattens out, further incremental inno-
vations fail to improve proﬁt rates and stagnation sets in. Only during
6For overviews on long-run innovation theories, see van Duijn (1983) or Lipsey et
al (1998).
8such times are investors willing to accept the higher risks of drastic in-
novations. Stagnations or depressions thus evolve solely because of lack
of drastic innovations, but they also trigger the appearance of a new
cluster of innovations and a new cycle.
Aside from the long-wave tradition, the cyclical character of knowl-
edge growth has been discussed also in other reseach areas. In one of the
most inﬂuential works in the philosophy of science, Thomas Kuhn (1962)
argues that the natural sciences have evolved in a process where nor-
mal science, characterized by incremental progress and ’puzzle solving-
activities’, is followed by a period of doubt when a pile of anomalies
make researchers question the existing scientiﬁc paradigm. Eventually,
a scientiﬁc revolution occurs and a new paradigm that better ﬁts the
accumulated facts is introduced.
In their works on economic history, Landes (1969) and Mokyr (1990)
provide several examples of how periods of revolutionary change have
been followed by periods of much slower innovative activity. In the
productivity literature, Gordon (2000) argues that the many electricity-
related innovation in the closing decades of the nineteenth century ini-
tiated a powerful wave of productivity growth that lasted even beyond
World War II. The idea that assymmetric technological change might
cause economic cycles has been picked up by the Real Business Cycle-
literature where random technology shocks are seen as an important
source of short-term variations in output (Kydland and Prescott, 1982).
Jovanovic and Rob (1990) model ’Schumpeterian cycles’ or ’long waves’
of technological change. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) and Help-
man (1998) coined the phrase General Purpose Technologies to analyze
the longer term eﬀects of drastic innovations in a growth theoretic frame-
work.
What empirical evidence are there of cyclical technological change?
In particular, do the data support the Schumpeter/Mensch-hypothesis
that drastic innovations tend to appear in clusters? The rest of this
section will deal with that issue. Mensch (1979, Tables 4.1-4.4) lists 111
’basic innovations’ introduced between 1796 and 1955. Both the year of
innovation and the year of invention are provided, where the former is
the date when, ’...a technological basic innovation...is being put into reg-
ular production for the ﬁrst time.’ (Mensch, 1979, p 123). The year of
invention marks the date of basic discovery of the main principle behind
the innovation. As an example, Mensch claims the year of invention of
synthetic rubber (Neopren) to be 1906, when J.A. Nieuwland observed
the acetylen reaction in alkali medium, and the year of innovation to be
1932 when the ﬁrm E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company introduced
Neopren into the market. Mensch’s deﬁnitions of ’basic innovations’ and
9’inventions’ are therefore very similar to the concepts ’drastic innova-
tions’ and ’discovery’ developed above. The sample of basic innovations
has been distilled mainly from Jewkes et al (1958).
Clark et al (1983) criticize the Mensch sample on the grounds that
nearly a dozen of the case studies in Jewkes et al (1958) have not been in-
cluded, nor have the ten additional cases in the second edition of Jewkes
et al (1958) been used. Apart from this, Clark et al disagree with the
dating of some innovations and inventions and have suggested alter-
native datings. When these changes to the Mensch-data are made, a
Clark-Freeman-Soete sample (CFS) of 132 drastic innovations emerges.
In a similar fashion, van Duijn (1983, Table 10.1) presents a com-
pilation of 160 drastic innovations made between 1811 and 1971. Van
Duijn uses a greater number of sources and the drastic innovations that
have been picked out often coincide with those of Mensch and CFS, but
not always. Even when all three samples include a certain innovation,
the stated years of innovation and invention might diﬀer. For instance,
Mensch maintains that the invention of the telephone occurred in 1854
and the innovation in 1881, while van Duijn’s corresponding dates are
1860 and 1877.
Naturally, the determination of such dates is a complicated and some-
what arbitrary task. Among several diﬃc u l t i e sw i t ht h i sk i n do fs a m -
pling, van Duijn mentions the following: (i) Innovation heterogeneity in
character. The wide spectrum of diﬀerent kinds of innovations in totally
diﬀerent ﬁelds makes measurement of importance along a single scale
very diﬃcult. Objectivity is hard to establish. (ii) Innovation hetero-
geneity in impact. The innovation of the telephone was most likely far
more important than the innovation of DDT, yet both are included as
drastic innovations. (iii) Time bias. The importance of an innovation
can usually not be ascertained until many years have passed, often even
decades. All else equal, there should thus be a tendency to underesti-
mate the importance of recent innovations. (iv) Past and present.T h e
perception of how important innovations are might change with time.
DDT, which was mentioned above, would nowadays rather be seen as
a menace to the environment than as a welfare-enhancing technological
breakthrough.
Despite these diﬃculties, some clear regularities in the data seem to
be robust to most objections. Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution
of drastic innovations and discoveries 1800-1941 according to the Mensch
sample. Several things are worth noting. First, the wave-like character
of the drastic innovations-curve suggests that this kind of technological
change is cyclical. At least, this seems to hold for the second half of the
time period. Second, two waves in drastic innovations can be singled
10out; the ﬁrst starting prior to 1880, the second taking oﬀ around 1930.
Third, the ﬁgure suggests that the appearance of drastic innovations is
more uneven and wave-like than the development of discoveries. Indeed,
the curve for discoveries suggests a more or less random distribution of
discoveries over time. The same waves can be observed also in the CFS
and van Duijn samples. However, the seemingly random distribution of
discoveries does not appear when graphing the time distribution of the
van Duijn data points.
By calculating a seven-year moving average time series for the num-
ber of drastic innovations per year for each of the Mensch, CFS and van
Duijn samples, we get a clearer picture of the trends in drastic innova-
tion activity. Figure 2 shows the three resulting curves for the interval
1800-1968. To begin with, it should be recognized that the CFS-curve
is an exact mirror image of the Mensch-curve until 1900 since the two
samples are in fact identical until then. The notable feature in general is
that the three samples give a very similar picture of cyclical behaviour.
No great clustering of innovations can be detected before 1870. Both
curves then make a dramatic turn upwards at the year 1876. This wave
of innovation activity culminates in the middle of the 1880s whereupon
there is a sharp decline. A much less distinct peak can possibly be sup-
ported around 1910, at least for the CFS and van Duijn samples. The
really signiﬁcant increase does not appear until the end of the 1920s.
The CFS and, even more, the van Duijn-curve, then suggest a pervasive
boom in R&D that lasts for several years. The Mensch-curve, however,
falls sharply already before World War II. As noted above, because of
the time bias, one should be careful about overinterpreting the years
near the end of the interval.
3 The Technological Opportunity Set
The central question in this article is why technological progress is cycli-
cal, i.e. evolving through periods with clusters of drastic innovations,
followed by periods of lower activity. In this section, I will use the notion
of technological progress through the recombination of existing ideas,
suggested by Schumpeter (1934) and Weitzman (1998). The framework
for the combinatory process will be based upon Olsson (2000) and as-
sume that the technology set and its corresponding technological oppor-
tunity set are embedded in a metric technology space. The analysis will
be structured around the two basic premises discussed in the previous
section; that there are three kinds of technological progress - incremen-
tal innovations, drastic innovations, and discoveries - and that the time
distribution of (drastic) innovations is asymmetric.
The context for the model below is that individual ideas are deﬁned in
11metric technology space T ⊂ Rk
+ which is the universal set of all possible
technological ideas in the past, in the present, and in the future. Each
individual idea in ∈ T is a k-dimensional vector of positive, real-valued
coordinates where k>1 is the number of dimensions in human thinking.
k thus includes complexity, abstractness, mathematics, utility, etc.
T’s metric is the technological distance function d(im,i n) where im,i n
are individual ideas contained in technology space.7 This function mea-
sures the objectively determined distance between any two ideas in tech-
nology space.8 The distance function d(·) is meant to convey that ideas
are more or less closely related. An idea like ’wheeled transport’ is tech-
nologically close to the idea ’automobile’. Neither idea, however, has
much in common with an idea like ’electric light bulb’. Hence, techno-
logical distance between ’wheeled transport’ and ’automobile’ is shorter
than between ’automobile’ and ’electric light bulb’. The distance func-
tion satisﬁes the necessary requirements for deﬁning a metric space: (i)
d(im,i n) ≥ 0 and d(im,i n)=0iﬀ im = in, (ii) d(im,i n)=d(in,i m) ∀
im,i n ∈ T, and (iii) d(im,i n)+d(in,i o) ≥ d(im,i o).
The technological knowledge set At ⊂ T is the set of all known tech-
nological ideas at time t. It should be seen as the union of all technolog-
ical ideas in the world rather than as describing any individual country’s
state of technology. In antiquity, this set included ideas like ’aqueduct’,
’horse power’, and ’the sail’. In late medieval times, At included ’the
wind mill’, ’the clock’, and ’the printing press.’ At the beginning of the
twentieth century, At contained ideas like ’steam engine’, ’telephone’,
and ’automobile’. It should be made clear, however, that although all
the examples mentioned are drastic innovations, At also includes the nu-
merous accumulated incremental innovations made in the time period
[0,t]. There is no depreciation of technological knowledge which means
that At−1 ⊆ At at all t. A piece of technology that once has been em-
ployed for the production of some good or service can always be used
again, though with inferior eﬃciency. The complement of At is AC
t which
contains all technological principles that have still not been discovered
at time t.
The technology set has a number of technical properties. To begin
with, At ∪ AC
t = T, i.e. the technology set and its complement is what
7The notion of a metric technology space with a corresponding ’distance function’
can be found, for instance, in Jaﬀe (1986), Dosi (1988), and Kauﬀman et al (2000).
See Olsson (2000) for a more thorough treatment of the set theoretic properties of a
’knowledge set’.
8It might be argued that technological distance between ideas rather should be
modelled as subjective, depending maybe on an individual’s knowledge and experi-
ences, or that distance between any two given ideas possibly should be allowed to
vary over time.
12constitutes technology space. Furthermore, At is inﬁnite, closed and
bounded.I n ﬁnity implies that the number of ideas in At is always inﬁnite
and therefore irrelevant for analysis. However, since At is bounded in T,
the ’size’ of At is ﬁnite. The assumption that At is closed implies that
it includes all its boundary points. The boundary points of At might
be thought of as the technological frontier at time t. Finally, I assume
that the size of At, or any other subset Zn ⊂ T, can be captured by a
size function s(Zn) ∈ R+ which satisﬁes the properties: (i) Z1 ⊂ Z2 =⇒
s(Z1) <s(Z2), and (ii) s(Z1 ∪ Z2)=s(Z1)+s(Z2)− s(Z1 ∩ Z2). The
size of the technology set at time t will be denoted s(At)=At.
The technology set and its surrounding technology space is depicted
in Figure 3. Without loss of generality, I assume k =2in order to make
the representation simple. Disregarding all the dots and straight lines
for a moment, we have initially a set At that apart from all its other
characteristics also is nonconvex.
Let us now see how the set of technological knowledge evolves. The
crucial assumption in this setting is that new ideas in the form of incre-
mental and drastic innovations are formed through linear, binary com-
binations of existing ideas, undertaken by entrepreneurs, whereas in-
dividual discoveries appear independently from other ideas. In Figure
3, incremental innovations are described as the linear combinations of
technologically close ideas in the nonconvex parts of At (to the left and
right). For instance, combining the two ideas il and im, both contained
in At, results in the new idea in which was not previously included. The
new idea’s location in technology space becomes in = λnil +(1− λn)im
where 0 < λn < 1. in is then used for subsequent linear combinations,
which yield yet other ideas that can be used, and so on. This process
is similar to Kuhn’s view of how normal science evolves. Nothing rad-
ically new results from this piecemeal advance of technology. Progress
is continuous and proceeds in a predictable fashion along the expected
routes.
It is easy to see that linear combinations of ideas can be made only
as long as At is nonconvex. When the limits to the left and right in the
ﬁgure are reached, the set is convex and incremental innovations are no
longer possible. Thus, the sections of AC
t that border the nonconvex sec-
tions of At might be described as the areas of technological opportunity.
In more formal terms, we can use the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 The technological opportunity set Bt is the smallest set
that satisﬁes the requirement that At ∪ Bt is convex.
Technological opportunity thus depends on the level of nonconvexity
in At.I f w e l e t s(Bt) be the size of the technological opportunity set,
13then s(Bt)=Bt ∈ R+ is a real-valued measure of nonconvexity or of
technological opportunity. A high Bt implies a great deal of technolog-
ical opportunity and vice versa. Furthermore, we also have that during
periods of ’normal’ incremental innovations, Bt−1 ≥ Bt at all t.9 Bt will
play an important role in the next section.
Obviously, progress comes to an end when technological opportu-
nity is nearly exhausted, i.e. as Bt goes to 0. How can there be any
progress beyond this limit? The answer lies in an interplay between dis-
coveries and drastic innovations. As was discussed above, entrepreneurs,
researchers or laymen occasionally stumble upon some completely new
and unexpected insight that does not ﬁt into the prevailing technological
paradigm. Torricelli’s discovery of atmospheric pressure and Fleming’s
accidental ﬁnding of the principle behind penicillin, are examples which
were mentioned above. Such ﬁndings are not the result of linear combi-
nations of existing ideas, purposefully made by entrepreneurs. Instead,
they have the character of ’new island formations’, isolated from the
coherent mass of technological knowledge. Some empirical evidence sug-
gest that discoveries appear more or less continuously in time (see Figure
1). In Figure 3, discoveries are represented by the isolated black dots
in technology space. To begin with, not many entrepreneurs pay any
attention to these anomalies to the existing paradigm. As long as there
is plenty of normal technological opportunity, no one bothers to under-
take the highly risky and costly endeavour of trying to understand the
technological potential of the isolated discoveries.
As technological opportunity approaches exhaustion, it becomes clear
to entrepreneurs that progress will soon come to an end. Since the ex-
pected proﬁts from further incremental innovation are lower than the
expected proﬁts from drastic innovation, the entrepreneurs move their
attention to the unexplored, isolated discoveries of technology space and
start trying to make combinations between these discoveries and already
familiar ideas in At. After considerable eﬀorts in terms of time and
money, entrepreneurs eventually succeed in making such ’long-distance’
combinations and a cluster of drastic innovations appear. The wave of
electricity-related innovations in the late 1800s might serve as an exam-
ple. The combination of existing technologies for lighting, interpersonal
communication, and sound reproduction with the discovery of electric-
ity, gave the world such drastic innovations as the electric light bulb, the
telephone, and the record player.
When the majority of the discoveries in this way have been connected
9Several earlier works have suggested that the decline in research outputs per
worker that has been evident since (at least) World War II probably is a result of
diminishing technological opportunity (Caballero and Jaﬀe, 1993; Kortum, 1997).
14to the technology set, the period of drastic innovation comes to an end.
The drastic innovations have created new areas of nonconvexity, i.e. the
size of the technological opportunity set, Bt, has increased. I will refer
to such a phenomenon as a technological paradigm shift:
Deﬁnition 2 If Bt >B t−1, then a technological paradigm shift has oc-
curred at t.
The technological paradigm shift induces a wave of incremental in-
novations that tie up the loose ends that the drastic innovations have
left in their wake. The more than hundred years of gradual improve-
ments in automobiles since Benz’ three-wheeler in 1885, is an example
of this process. Innovative activity continues to be intense as the vast
new areas of technological opportunity are exploited, but progress is now
once again predictable and nonrevolutionary. While entrepreneurs make
proﬁts from normal science, new discoveries continue to appear like new
islands in technology space. However, as long as there is plenty of tech-
nological opportunity in the prevailing paradigm, no one will pay these
isolated and distant ideas any attention. And so the technological long-
wave pattern repeats itself with decades of incremental normal progress
and random discoveries, followed by years of clusters of drastic inno-
vations which introduce new technological opportunities and paradigm
shifts.
4 The Full Model
The previous section showed how the diﬀerent kinds of technological
knowledge interacted and evolved over time in the technology space of
ideas. I this section, I present an extended but simple ’technological
opportunity model’ model of long-run economic growth. The carry-
ing theme will be that drastic innovations are undertaken in periods
of declining entrepreneurial proﬁt from normal activity. Entrepreneurs
are the main agents in this process and perform both incremental and
drastic innovations and then also reap the proﬁts. In this sense, the
model follows in the spirit of Schumpeter (1934), Mensch (1979), and
Jovanovic and Rob (1990), but the focus on technological opportunity
makes it quite diﬀerent from these and most other eﬀorts.
As before, the size of the technological opportunity set for a ’world
leader’ country at some time t is Bt = s(Bt) ≥ 0.10 There are two
sources of change in Bt: (i) Incremental innovations that decrease Bt
10The modelling of a ’world leader’ in technology allows us to disregard all aspects
of technological diﬀusion. See Olsson (2000) for a model that explicitly treats the
diﬀu s i o no fi d e a s .
15and (ii) technological paradigm shifts, caused by drastic innovations,
that reintroduce nonconvexity and increase the level of Bt.T h e t w o
growth processes are described in (1). Incremental innovation - i.e. the
convex combination of technological ideas that are technologically close
- is the normal situation. The change in technological opportunity is
then Bt−Bt−1 = −Bt−1
PN
i=1 δi where δi is the fraction of technological
opportunity at t − 1 that is successfully turned into new technological
knowledge (i.e. increases in s(At)=At) by individual entrepreneur i and
where N is the number of entrepreneurs. Assuming for simplicity that
δ1 = δ2 = ... = δN,w eh a v et h a t
PN
i=1 δi = N¯ δ = δ < 1.Nand average
entrepreneurial capacity ¯ δ are exogenously given parameters.11 Hence,
at any time t,o n l y(1 − δ)Bt−1 is available to the N entrepreneurs for
exploitation. In the long-run setting of this model, the time elapsed
























Decades of normal technological activity are also associated with a
zero-sum relation between the sizes of the sets for technological oppor-
tunity and knowledge: Bt−1 − Bt = At − At−1 = δBt−1. If, on the other
hand, there is a paradigm shift at t − 1,t h e nAt − At−1 =0 . Thus, the
technology set grows only through incremental innovations. The rela-
tively small number of drastic innovations that appear during paradigm
shifts do not increase At directly, but since such innovations reintroduce
technological opportunity, they have a crucial indirect eﬀect on the level
of technological knowledge.
Entrepreneurs form their decisions on the basis of rational expecta-
tions about next decade’s proﬁts. If next decade’s expected entrepre-












, all entrepreneurs switch from incremental to drastic innova-
tion at t.1213 The change in technological opportunity is then Bt−Bt−1 =
11As argued by Baumol (1990) and others, the allocation of entrepreneurial talent
to productive activities probably depends on social institutions and on the incentive




t should be thought of in terms of proﬁts per capita,t h a ti s
proﬁts divided by the whole population in the economy. Scaling proﬁts in this way is
necessary because the discussion below will deal with income per capita. Note that
the analytical use of proﬁts per capita as the key variable does not give diﬀerent
results from using the more intuitive proﬁts per entrepreneur.
13This inequality-condition for innovative activity resembles the condition for ’ex-
16Dt > 0. In this sense, a trough in the economy triggers a technologi-
cal paradigm shift. Dt reﬂects the size of the technological opportunity
shock that is created by the wave of drastic innovations and by the
accompanying paradigm shift.
Dt is a random variable whose expected value Et (Dt)=g (t,δ,A t)
depends positively on the random number of accumulated discoveries at
the time of the paradigm shift and on δ and the level of At. All else equal,
the greater the entrepreneurial capacity and the greater the body of ex-
isting technological knowledge, the greater the expected technological
opportunity shock. Thus, whereas the evolution of Bt is highly pre-
dictable during normal innovative activity, decreasing by a percentage
of δ, the increase in the wake of a paradigm shift is not.
The stochastic level of proﬁt per capita from drastic innovation, ΠD
t ,
is determined by two factors; the cost of combining an existing idea with
a distant discovery and the revenue from that same undertaking. The
cost for this kind of operation is always substantial, involving advanced
machinery and eﬀort by several people with expertise both on existing
knowledge and on the rare discovery. Let us assume that the cost of
a drastic innovation is c>0 with certainty. Revenues are inﬂuenced
by forces of demand which are more diﬃcult to get a grip of for the
individual entrepreneur. Let total revenues R be uniformly distributed
(R ∼ U (·)) in the closed interval [0,r] with the probability of total failure
(R =0 )being just as likely as the probability of the maximum revenue
(R = r). Hence, proﬁts per capita ΠD
t = R−c is a random variable which
a s s u m e sv a l u e si nt h ei n t e r v a l[r − c,−c]. It can also be easily shown that
the density function for some x ∈ [0,r] is simply f (x;r − c,−c)=1
r and
















is thus constant across time. Note that a requirement for
drastic innovations ever to be undertaken is that (2) is positive, which
implies that we must have that r>2c.14
Proﬁts per capita from incremental innovation are a function of tech-











E (At − At−1) (3)
tensive’ versus ’intensive’ search in Jovanovic and Rob (1990). In reality, it is never
t h ec a s et h a tall entrepreneurs switch from incremental to drastic innovation simul-
taneously. The assumption is made to keep the model simple.
14It should also be remarked that according to the speciﬁcations above, ΠD
t is
independent of Dt. What this means is that the proﬁtablility of drastic innovations
is uncorrelated with the size of the paradigm shift that they induce.
17Unlike ΠD
t , ΠI
t is not a stochastic variable. Since Bt−1, δ, and ωE
are all known at t − 1, entrepreneurs know with certainty what prof-
its they can make in the next period from incremental innovation. At
all t characterized by normal R&D activity, a fraction δ < 1 of exist-
ing technological opportunity is exploited and the proﬁts show up with
a lag in the next period. ωE > 0 is an entrepreneurial productivity
parameter that indicate to what extent exploited technological opportu-
nity is transformed into proﬁts. δ captures the inherent capacity of the
’world leader’-society to exploit intellectual opportunities. This crucial
determinant of development is modelled as a constant but should ideally
be seen as time varying and probably a function of a country’s human
capital and societal institutions.15
The lag between the extraction of ideas at t-1 and the proﬁts at t
is a result of the time needed for entrepreneurs to bring the new idea
to the market and for consumers to get acquainted with it. The costs
for incremental innovations are lower than the costs of drastic innova-
tions.16 For simplicity, I assume that the costs are zero and that proﬁts
are directly proportional to the exploited fraction of technological op-
portunity. Since it was shown before that δBt−1 = At − At−1, it follows
that ΠI
t is also proportional to the increase in technological knowledge.
By substituting in the expressions for Bt−1 from (1), we can fur-
t h e rs e et h a tw em u s th a v ee i t h e rΠI
t = ωEδ (1 − δ)Bt−2 or ΠI
t =
ωEδ(Bt−2 + Dt−1), depending on whether t − 1 was characterized by
normal activity or by drastic innovations. Since Bt shrinks during nor-
mal activity, the standard case is that ΠI
t−1 > ΠI
t. Proﬁts continue to






By using (3) and (2), we can therefore deﬁne the actual level of































The break-even point for expected proﬁts, i.e. the level where an
entrepreneur is indiﬀerent between continued incremental innovation
and a switch to drastic innovative activity, is thus ΠI







2 (r − 2c), implying a critical level of technological op-
portunity, B∗ = 1
ωEδ (r − 2c). When Bt−1 is equal to or lower than this
level, all entrepreneurs switch to drastic innovative activity at time t.
As noted above, expected proﬁts will then be 1
2 (r − 2c), but the actual
15Olsson (2000) includes a lengthy discussion of the factors behind technological
creativity. See also Mokyr (1990) and Baumol (1990) for inﬂuential accounts on the
same issue.
16The same assumption is made in Jovanovic and Rob (1990).
18level might of course end up below the expected value and below last
period’s proﬁts from incremental innovations. At t +1 ,i n c r e m e n t a li n -
novation once again becomes proﬁtable since technological opportunity
has increased by Dt during t. Thus, a new period of normal innovative
activity is initiated.
Lastly, I will propose an extremely general function for logged aggre-
gate income per capita:
lnyt = ω
Mzt =l nyt−1 + Πt (5)
zt stands for a broad interpretation of capital per capita, including
both human and physical capital, and ωM > 0 is a parameter. Together
they form an aggregate production function whose output equals logged
income per capita in the previous decade plus proﬁts per capita at t.
Entrepreneurial proﬁt per capita Πt is either equal to realized proﬁt
from incremental or from drastic innovation. The growth rate in this
economy is therefore simply given by lnyt − lnyt−1 = Πt, i.e. in the
long run, it is entrepreneurial proﬁts from innovative activities that drive
economic development. Note also that during years of normal innovative
activity, lnyt−lnyt−1 = ωM (zt − zt−1)=ωE (At − At−1), implying that
the increase in technological knowledge is transformed into increases in
capital according to zt − zt−1 = ωE
ωM (At − At−1).
5A n a l y s i s
The ﬁve equations in the section above do not allow for any straightfor-
ward analytical solutions or results. However, the system of equations
can be used to simulate the behaviour of the model under diﬀerent as-
sumptions. Table 1 shows the results from ﬁve such simulations.17 By





, we receive diﬀer-
ent values for the endogenously determined relative levels of output in
the ﬁnal period (y20/y0) and technological knowledge (A20/A0).W ea l s o
receive a varying number of cycles. As a general conclusion, the lower





, the lower the levels of (y20) and (A20) and
the fewer the number of paradigm shifts. For instance, an ’extraction’
rate of 5 percent (δ =0 .05) and a critical lower level of output growth





=0 .001),r e s u l ti na n
end-period output level that is roughly 1.8 times the initial level and a
17In all cases, I have used ωE =0 .001,B −1 = 100,y 0 = 1000,A 0 = 1000, and No.of
periods =2 0 .D t is a random, uniformly distributed variable computed according to
the formula RANUNI∗At/20∗(1+δ)+30where RANUNI is a computer-generated
number between 0 and 1. As mentioned in the text, Dt is thus a positive function of
At and δ. Likewise, ΠD







19technological knowledge that has increased by a mere 6.1 percent. Dur-
ing the twenty periods, there is not a single paradigm shift. In contrast,





result in six paradigm
shifts, a more than 154 times higher relative level of end-period output
(y20/y0 = 154.503) and a more than 46 percent greater level of techno-
logical knowledge (A20/A0 =1 .461).
Table 1: Model simulation results
Case
I II III IV V






0.001 0.005 0.01 0.01 0.02
y20/y0 1.839 4.834 18.651 29.516 154.503
A20/A0 1.061 1.145 1.273 1.283 1.461
No. of shifts 0 2 4 4 6
The time series for Cases I and IV are plotted in Figures 4-5. The
ﬁgures show the simulated patterns of proﬁts/output growth rates and
paradigm shifts over twenty periods where the size of the technological
opportunity shock is downscaled 200 times so that the two curves can
be illustrated in the same diagram. As was mentioned above, one period
should not be thought of as being equivalent to one year but rather as
a ten-year period. Thus, the ﬁgures might be interpreted as covering a
two hundred year-era, in particular the period 1800-2000.






are relatively low. During the whole period, the growth rate
lingers between 0.5 and 0.18 percentage points with an average of 0.31
percent. In a very slow manner, the growth rate converges towards the
critical level 0.1, but even in period 20, the attainment of the critical
level lies far ahead in the future. Case I illustrates a society with a
stable, non-dynamic development where improvements in standards of
living are hardly recognizeable during an average human life.






are higher (0.3 and 0.01 respectively). The result is
a much higher average growth rate (1.8 percent) but also a much more
volatile time series (standard deviation is 1.5 percentage points). Four
cycles with a duration of four to ﬁve decades are endogenously created,
implying the familiar ’long wave-pattern’ of 40-50 year cycles. One seri-
ous depression in the fourth decade occurs as a result of the technological
paradigm shift. During all other periods with paradigm shifts, the proﬁt
from drastic innovation exceeds the expected level, signiﬁcantly so in
the ninth decade. In general, Case IV describes a dynamic development
process that is far from the stable, undramatic scenario in Figure 4.
20From (4) and (5), we know that the growth rate of income per capita,
and hence the whole development process, might be summarized in a
general function
lnyt − lnyt−1 = Πt = g (r,c,δ;Bt−1) (6)
where r,c and δ are exogenous parameters and where Bt−1 is an endoge-
nously determined variable.18 Let us discuss each component in turn.






. The maximum revenue from drastic innovations,
r, depends crucially on a society’s system of intellectual property rights.
Without property rights, a new idea is a nonexcludable good which
anyone can utilize freely. The most important institution for intellec-
tual property rights is presumably the patent. An enforceable patent
gives its holder a temporary monopoly to some idea and the patentee is
guaranteed the proﬁts from commercial exploitation. The patent is a re-
cent institution, dating back to laws passed in early seventeenth century
Britain (Mokyr, 1990). However, a patent to a drastic innovation is a
necessary but not a suﬃcient condition for a high r. Equally important is
probably the existence of a free market and a demand for new goods.A s
Landes (1969) notes, at the time of the Industrial Revolution, Western
Europe had already moved away from subsistence levels of consumption
and could thus aﬀord the luxury of new goods.
Proﬁts from drastic innovations of course also depend on the costs
incurred. Costs arise from the employment of physical capital and labour
and should generally increase with the technological distance between
the discovery and the existing idea to be combined. Innovative activities
are risky endeavours and as discussed by Schumpeter (1934) and later
writers, an entrepreneur’s proﬁt often hinges on his or her availability of
credit. In this respect, banks and ﬁnancial markets play a crucial role.
A well-functioning credit market should imply lower levels of c.
But even if revenues are high and costs of drastic innovation are low,
the cluster of technological breakthroughs becomes useless unless people
are able to eﬀectively utilize the technological opportunity created. This
is where the δ-parameter ﬁts in. As discussed above, δ = N¯ δ where N is
the number of entrepreneurs and ¯ δ is their average capacity to exploit the
potential of technological paradigms. Obviously, an exogenous increase
in the number of entrepreneurs N leads to a proportional increase in
exploitation capacity. ¯ δ probably depends to a great extent on the level
of human capital and on the underlying institutions of a society. Gen-
eral levels of literacy, technical proﬁciency, and life expectancy should
18I choose to ignore the parameters ωM and ωE in this analysis.
21have positive eﬀects on ¯ δ. Likewise, institutions such as corporate laws,
universities, freedom of technological inquiry, and a favourable public
attitude towards rationalism and scientiﬁc curiousity, are all important
explanations for the level of ¯ δ. The rise of commercial R&D departments
within big ﬁrms in the late nineteenth century led to a routinized innova-
tion process and was a major watershed in the history of technology that
probably greatly increased both ¯ δ and N (Schumpeter, 1942; Peretto,
1998).
The prime source of growth in the model above, however, is tech-
nological opportunity. Except for being heavily inﬂuenced by the level
of the parameters r,c and δ,B t also depends crucially on the size of
the random technological opportunity shocks Dt. It was discussed ear-
lier that the level of Dt depends on the random and exogenously given
appearance of discoveries. In some eras, discoveries happen to be more
frequent than in other eras. Consequently, the technological opportunity
shock induced by drastic innovations varies from one paradigm shift to
another, with obvious eﬀects on the ensuing growth rate (see Figures
4-5). This also means that there is a substantial random element in the
whole development process.
Does the model then give a reasonable description of economic his-
tory? The rest of this section will discuss that issue. I would argue that
Figure 4 gives a roughly accurate picture of world economic development
before 1800. As has been suggested by Maddison (1982), Fogel (1999)
and others, per capita income levels have remained near subsistence lev-
els during most of world history. Some estimates indicate that growth
of GDP per capita was nonexistent until about 1500 AD when average
income levels started to grow by a modest 0.1 percent a year (Maddison,
1982, Table 1.2).
The model and the simulations above can favourably be reconciled
with these facts. Before about 1800, the absence of a world demand for
new goods and an eﬃcient system of intellectual property rights implied
that expected revenues from drastic innovation (r) were very likely to
b el o w e ro ro n l ys l i g h t l ya b o v et w i c et h ec o s t s(2c) so that no or very
few technological paradigm shifts were endogenously generated. Fur-
thermore, low general levels of education, a low esteem of production-
related knowledge, and poorly functioning corporate and private prop-
erty laws probably meant that δ was hovering near zero. Thus techno-
logical progress was slow and incremental. Analogously, growth of per
capita income was also slow or nonexistent and largely noncyclical. All
these circumstances greatly resemble the situation depicted in Figure 4.
With the introduction of public education, intellectual property rights,
a world market for new goods, and social norms towards technological
22advance, nineteenth century Britain was the ﬁrst country to experience
as h o c ki nt h el e v e l so fr and δ that was suﬃciently strong to set the
endogenous innovation-machinery in motion. Germany and the United
States then followed by the end of the 1800s.
With the shock in the levels of r and δ that occurred after 1800, the
Western world entered the capitalist era. By 1820, US income per capita
(in 1990 US dollars) was 1,287 (Maddison, 1995). It is well known that
the subsequent era was characterized by relatively high average growth
rates, a greater degree of variability and of cyclic behaviour, greater
proﬁts for entrepreneurial activity, and faster technological progress. All
these ingredients are present in Figure 5. The ’capitalist engine’ quickly
exploits technological opportunities so that only about ﬁfty years after
a paradigm shift takes place, another one is introduced. Growth rates
change by up to six percentage points from one decade to another (see
periods 4 and 5). In the simulation, the level of output increases from
1,000 in the starting period to 29,516 in the end-period. This twenty
nine-fold rise in income is roughly in line with the Maddison data where
US income increased from 1,287 in 1820 to 22,569 in 1994. In comparison
to earlier epochs, the capitalist era is a roller-coaster ride of creation
and destruction that, in Schumpeter’s (1942, p 83) words ’...incessantly
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying
the old one, incessantly creating a new one.’
Apart from being in line with these common generalizations of eco-
nomic history, how well does the model survive a more careful investi-
gation of available data? Figure 6 shows drastic innovation activity and
GDP per capita growth for the time period 1870 to 1968. The drastic
innovation curve is a composite index of the seven-year moving aver-
ages of the Mensch, van Duijn, and CFS time series in Figure 2. The
growth curve shows the seven-year moving average of the average an-
nual GDP per capita growth rate in United Kingdom, United States,
and Germany. These countries were arguably the three world leaders
at the time in terms of innovation activity. The calculations use data
from Maddison (1995). The inclusion of Germany makes the time series
highly volatile, especially during the period 1918-1950 when both post-
war depressions and subsequent recoveries are more intense in Germany
than in the less badly hurt UK and the US. In general, it should be
acknowledged that the numerous economic, political and institutional
inﬂuences that the three sample countries were subjected to during this
era, make causal interpretations a complicated task.
Nevertheless, when the two curves are presented jointly, some inter-
esting regularities appear. Among the nineteenth century growth rates
23in the period covered, 1876 has the lowest rate (0.99 percent).19 This
is also the date when the intensity in drastic innovation takes oﬀ in a
remarkable increase, reaching a peak in 1882. Late nineteenth century
growth rates, however, did not reach a peak until 1898. Relating these
facts to the model, one might argue that the low growth rates around
1875 triggered the electricity-related paradigm shift that unfolded during
the following years. The growth payoﬀs from the technological oppor-
tunity shock that drastic innovations such as the telephone, the electric
light bulb, the gasoline motor and electric heating introduced, did not
materialize until the last years of the 1800s. This lag from the peak of
the drastic innovation wave and the increase in growth, is certainly well
in line with the predictions of Figure 5.
From 1898, it is clear that despite at least two business cycle booms,
a long downward trend is initiated that lasts until the end of World War
I. A signiﬁcant post-war boom then ensues with a peak in 1925, only
to be followed by the worst non-war related depression in recorded eco-
nomic history. One might therefore speak of a downward trend in growth
rates that lasts until 1929. An interesting fact is that drastic innovation
activity starts picking up again from very low levels around 1916. The
really sharp increase, however, does not occur until about 1928. From
1932 to 1937, the Mensch-sample records as many as sixteen drastic
innovations, for instance the radar, the rocket, television, helicopters,
titanium, and the kodachrome camera. Activity peaks in 1934 and then
declines.20 The height of output growth is reached ﬁve years later, in
1939. If we disregard the war years and the post-war depression in war-
ridden Germany, we see that the ’normal’ growth process seems to start
again in the beginning of the 1950s, this time at substantially higher
growth levels. There is then once again a long-run downward trend that
continues into the 1990s.
Even this twentieth century picture might be regarded as supporting
the main hypotheses advanced in this article. The technological para-
digm shift of the 1930s appears after a serious depression and after three
decades of a falling trend in growth rates. After World War II, growth
rates stabilize at unprecedented high levels, no doubt largely because
of the economic integration of Western Europe, but probably also as a
result of the new technological opportunity created by the drastic inno-
vations of the 1930s. As technological opportunity wanes, growth rates
19The annual growth rates for each country in 1876 are -0.09 percent for the UK,
-0.96 for the US, and -1.77 for Germany.
20The CFS-sample indicates that the real decline does not start until 1943, whereas
the van Duijn-sample suggests a decline starting as late as 1950. All of them, however,
records a sharp peak in 1934.
24gradually decline during the late 1960s and 1970s.
It would certainly be incorrect to claim that my interpretation of
Figure 6 provides conclusive evidence in support of my model. How-
ever, my two main hypotheses - that a cluster of drastic innovations
should appear after a longer period of falling growth rates and that
growth rates a decade or so after the paradigm shift should be relatively
high - do indeed receive some support from the data. A more careful
econometric analysis should be able to shed further light on the causal
relationships between technological revolutions and economic growth.
6G r o w t h T h e o r y
The technological opportunity model in section 4 departs in signiﬁcant
ways from most previous economic growth models. The primary dif-
ference is probably that it is technological opportunity Bt rather than
the stock of technological knowledge At that is the crucial factor for
long run growth. Regardless of the size of At, Bt must be greater than
zero if there is going to be any growth in the economy. Furthermore,
the endogenously created technological paradigm shifts gives fundamen-
tally diﬀerent implications for the behaviour of growth in the very long
run. In this section, I will brieﬂy compare the implications of my model
for long-run growth with the implications of the neoclassical and the
endogenous growth models.
Let us consider the following two models: (i) The neoclassical model
of Solow (1956) where income per capita equals y = Ak(t)α and where







.A su s u a l ,A is a
technology parameter, k (t) is capital per capita, s is the saving rate, and
γ is the depreciation rate of capital. (ii) The linear AK-model where
y = Ak(t) and gy =
˙ k
k = sA − γ.21
As is well known, with a k initially below its steady-state level and
in the absence of policy shocks, the neoclassical model yields positive
growth rates that decrease with time until the rate converges to zero.
Hence, the neoclassical model implies a dynamic pattern similar to that





.A t t h e
steady state level, only changes in the parameters s,A, and γ can make
the economy advance. For instance, an exogenous increase in A would
temporarily increase the growth rate and lead to a higher steady-state
level of output, but the eﬀects on growth would only be transitory since
21The AK-model has been treated by several growth theorists and is often associ-
ated with Romer (1986). In this category, I would also include contributions such as
Romer (1990) and Jones (1995).
25the equilibrium growth rate would still be zero. Although the issue is
far from generally agreed upon, there appears to be empirical evidence
in favour of such a ’conditional convergence’-hypothesis for the period
1960 to the present (Barro, 1991). In the long run perspective, however,
it is apparent that the world economy has not witnessed diminishing
returns and stagnating growth. On the contrary, average growth rates
have steadily increased from the sixteenth century onwards (Maddison,
1982). Repeated exogenous shocks to the levels of s, A, and γ can hardly
be regarded as satisfactory explanations for this development.
The endogenous growth models of the AK-type are better suited for
explaining development in the long run. Unlike the neoclassical model,
the AK-model implies a constant positive growth rate which is deter-
mined by the level of the parameters. An increase in a parameter such
as A results in a permanent increase in the growth rate. This conjecture
might indeed be considered as a reasonable description of the increase in
growth rates that the Western world witnessed from 1500 onwards and
that was most evident after the Industrial Revolution. However, the
slow but persistent decreases in growth rates that the UK, the United
States and Germany experienced both after 1898 and after 1950 are not
easily reconciled with the AK-model.
The technological opportunity model in this article has the advantage
of explaining both falling growth rates in the medium term and increas-
ing average growth rates in the very long run. Increases in δ and r that
took place in the nineteenth century led to a more pronounced cyclic
behaviour of development but also to higher average growth. Periods of
declining entrepreneurial proﬁts and GDP growth rates were succeeded
by a decade or so of intense drastic innovative activity, resulting in an
increase in technological opportunity and in average growth rates. This
pattern appears to have repeated itself at least during the clustering of
drastic innovations in the 1880s and 1930s.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The technological opportunity model presented in this article provides
one explanation to the puzzle of why technological progress is cyclical.
The proposition is simply that although incremental, non-revolutionary
innovation is the normal activity for proﬁt-maximizing entrepreneurs,
the gradual exhaustion of technological opportunity implies that the
time will always come when expected proﬁts from further incremental
innovations fall below expected proﬁts from highly risky and expen-
sive drastic innovation. For a brief and intense period, entrepreneurs
will therefore switch to drastic innovation and try to combine existing
technological knowledge with the previously isolated and technologically
26distant discoveries. The wave of drastic innovations that follow causes
a new technological paradigm to appear and reintroduces technological
opportunity. Entrepreneurs then switch back to riskless and once again
proﬁtable incremental innovation. The prediction that drastic innova-
tions will appear in bad times is supported by the data for the two inno-
vation clusters around 1880 and 1930. There is also some evidence that
average growth rates after the two waves of innovations were relatively
high.
The model might be extended in a number of directions. Perhaps
the most fundamental determinant of cycle duration and growth rates
of income is the societal capacity to exploit technological opportunity, δ.
In this setting, δ captures the quality of a number of diverse factors such
as human capital and social institutions. A possible extension would be
to let δ be determined endogenously. It would also be possible to let
the maximum revenue from drastic innovation, r, be the solution to an
optimization problem where the beneﬁt from property rights to ideas is
weighed against the beneﬁt of completely free ideas.
The most obvious candidate for further research is probably a more
elaborate econometric analysis of the relationship between drastic inno-
vations and economic growth. The model and the data presented in this
article have suggested that an important long-run relationship might be
present, a relationship that the empirical growth literature, mainly using
data from 1960, possibly has missed.
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of discoveries and drastic innovations according to the 










































Note: The figure displays three series of seven-year moving averages of drastic innovations per year on the 
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Note: The GDP growth-curve is obtained by calculating a seven-year moving average for the average 
annual growth rates of UK, the US, and Germany. The drastic innovation-curve shows a composite seven-
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